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Commercial banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement
traditional retail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of
wholesale funding: sophisticated ￿nanciers can monitor banks, disciplining bad ones
but re￿nancing solvent ones. This paper models a "dark side" of wholesale funding.
In an environment with a costless but imperfect signal on bank project quality (e.g.,
credit ratings, performance of peers), short-term wholesale ￿nanciers have lower
incentives to conduct costly information acquisition, and instead may withdraw
based on negative but noisy public signals, triggering ine¢ cient liquidations. We
show that the "dark side" of wholesale funding dominates the "bright side" when
bank assets are more arm￿ s length and tradable (leading to more relevant public
signals and lower liquidation costs): precisely the attributes of a banking sector
with securitizations and risk transfers. The results shed light on the recent ￿nancial
turmoil, explaining why some wholesale ￿nanciers did not provide market discipline
ex-ante and exacerbated liquidity risks ex-post.
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11 Introduction
Commercial banks increasingly borrow short-term wholesale funds to supplement tradi-
tional retail deposits (Feldman and Schmidt, 2001) as a result of intense competition for
household savings from alternative investment institutions (mutual funds, life insurance
products, etc.). In response to funding shortage, banks tap into wholesale funding mar-
kets to attract liquidity surpluses of non￿nancial corporations, households (via money
market mutual funds), other ￿nancial institutions, state and local authorities, and for-
eign entities. Such wholesale funds are usually raised on a short-term rollover basis with
instruments such as Jumbo CDs (large-denomination certi￿cates of deposit), repurchase
agreements (Repo), fed funds, commercial paper, eurodollar deposits, and large brokered
deposits.
How would this change in funding structure a⁄ect bank risks? The existing literature
mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale funding: more fully exploiting valuable
investment opportunities without being constrained by the local deposit supply; the
ability of wholesale ￿nanciers to provide market discipline (Calomiris, 1999) and to
re￿nance unexpected retail withdrawals (Goodfriend and King, 1998).
However, the credit market turmoil that started in 2007 revealed a "dark side" of
wholesale funding. Banks can use wholesale funds to aggressively expand lending and
compromise credit quality, particularly when ￿nanciers exercise insu¢ cient market dis-
cipline. Later, at the re￿nancing stage, there is a risk of wholesale ￿nanciers abruptly
withdrawing upon a hint of negative news, triggering ine¢ cient liquidations. When
wholesale withdrawals follow a market-wide signal, correlated bank failures may exac-
erbate systemic risk.
This paper attempts to reconcile the traditional view on the virtues of wholesale
funding with the recent experience. We suggest that wholesale funding is bene￿cial
when informed, but exacerbates ine¢ ciencies and can create severe liquidity risks when
uninformed. We then ask:
2￿ What are the incentives for short-term wholesale ￿nanciers to invest in the acqui-
sition of information on bank project quality?
￿ What are the incentives for wholesale ￿nanciers at the re￿nancing stage to roll-over
funding or to force a bank into liquidation, particularly if they are uninformed?
￿ What are the optimal contractual arrangements for short-term wholesale funds
(e.g., their creditor seniority vis-a-vis long-term funds, such as core retail deposits)?
￿ What are the private incentives for banks to use short-term wholesale funds, and
could they diverge from socially optimal ones?
We consider a bank that ￿nances a risky long-term project with two sources of
funds: retail deposits and wholesale funds. Retail deposits are sluggish, insensitive to
risks (partly because they are insured), and provide a relatively stable source of long-
term funding.1 Wholesale funds are relatively sophisticated and have the capacity to
acquire information on bank project quality. However, they are short-term: provided
on a rollover basis and have to be re￿nanced before ￿nal returns realize or the bank will
be forced into liquidation.
Our modelling approach is based on Calomiris and Kahn (1991, hereafter CK). We
take CK as a benchmark of the ￿bright side￿ of wholesale funding. CK show that
"sophisticated" wholesale ￿nanciers add value through their capacity to monitor banks
and to impose market discipline (force liquidations) on loss-making ones. Moreover,
they show that monitoring incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers are maximized when they
are senior at re￿nancing stage, because it allows them to internalize the bene￿ts of
monitoring (payo⁄s in early liquidations).
1The "sluggishness" of retail deposits is a well-established stylized fact (Feldman and Schmidt, 2001;
Song and Thakor, 2007). Retail deposits are typically insured by the government. Their withdrawals are
motivated mostly by individual depositors￿liquidity needs and thus are predictable based on the law of
large numbers. Although some accounts are formally demandable, retail deposits are "sluggish" because
of the transaction services retail depositors received from the banks and the high switching costs (Sharpe,
1997; Kim, Kliger, and Vale, 2003). They therefore provide a relatively stable source of long-term funds.
However, the local retail deposit base is considered quasi-￿xed in size, as it is prohibitively expensive
to expand in the medium term (Flannery 1982; Billett and Gar￿nkel, 2004). When the deposit supply
is not su¢ cient to fund all available investment opportunities, banks can choose to attract, in addition,
wholesale funds from sophisticated institutional investors.
3In practice, short-term wholesale funds indeed enjoy de facto (e⁄ective) seniority
because of the ￿rst-come-￿rst-served sequential service rule and the relative sluggish-
ness of insured retail depositors. This was the main reason that in almost all recent
bank failures (e.g., Continental Illinois, Northern Rock, IndyMac) short-term wholesale
￿nanciers were able to exit well ahead of retail depositors without incurring signi￿cant
losses themselves. Interestingly, the well-publicized retail depositor run on Northern
Rock took place only after the bank had already nearly exhausted its liquid assets to
pay o⁄ the exit of short-term wholesale funds (Shin, 2008; Yorulmazer, 2008).2
We then introduce into the benchmark CK model a single novel feature: a costless
but noisy public signal on bank project quality. This represents public information that
wholesale ￿nanciers can costlessly process and that is a noisy proxy for bank-speci￿c
fundamentals. Examples include market prices or credit ratings for traded assets (e.g.,
mortgage-backed securities), performance of other similar banks, or various market-
or sector-wide indicators (e.g., house or energy prices). Wholesale ￿nanciers may use
the public signal when costly private monitoring does not produce su¢ ciently precise
information on bank fundamentals (because of either low investment in monitoring or
merely bad luck).
We show that this minor and plausible change to the CK setup can under some
conditions lead to outcomes consistent with the "dark side" of wholesale funding seen
in recent events. In our model, the presence of a costless but noisy signal:
￿ Lowers the incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers to monitor;
￿ Gives wholesale ￿nanciers excess incentives to liquidate banks based on overly
noisy public information; and
￿ Importantly, those distortions become stronger when wholesale ￿nanciers are more
2Marino and Bennett (1999) analyze six major bank failures in the US between 1984 and 1992 and
￿nd that uninsured large deposits fell signi￿cantly relative to small insured deposits prior to failures.
During the New England banking crisis, failing banks experienced a 70 percent decline in uninsured
deposits in their ￿nal two years of operation while being able to raise insured deposits to replace the
out￿ ow. Billett, Gar￿nkel, and O￿ Neal (1998) also ￿nd that banks typically raised their use of insured
deposits vis-a-vis wholesale deposits after being downgraded by Moody￿ s.
4senior claimants to the liquidated assets ￿in constrast to CK￿ s results.
The mechanism of these e⁄ects is that, absent a noisy public signal, uninformed
wholesale ￿nanciers always roll over funding at the intermediate stage as banks are
on average solvent (no news is good news). However, with the availability of a noisy
public signal, wholesale ￿nanciers uninformed about bank-speci￿c fundamentals can
now choose to liquidate a bank based solely on a negative but possibly very noisy public
signal.
The key ine¢ ciency is that the incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers to liquidate based on
noisy information can be too high compared to the socially optimal ones, particularly
when they are de facto senior claimants on the liquidation value. Upon liquidation,
senior wholesale ￿nanciers can obtain a larger share of a reduced bank asset pie, at the
expense of providers of long-term funds such as passive core depositors. As a second-
order e⁄ect, when wholesale ￿nanciers anticipate a high likelihood of an early liquidation
with a safe exit, they become less interested in acquiring costly private information on
bank project quality in the ￿rst place.
Therefore, in the presence of a noisy public signal, higher e⁄ective seniority of short-
term wholesale funds has two e⁄ects. One, in line with CK, is the positive ￿rst-order
e⁄ect that rewards monitoring and market discipline e⁄orts. Another, a novel one, is
the negative e⁄ect that increases the payo⁄ to liquidating banks based on overly noisy
information. The socially optimal seniority of short-term wholesale funds must therefore
trade-o⁄ the two o⁄setting e⁄ects. We ￿nd that such welfare-maximizing seniority has
an interior optimum. While the monitoring incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers increase
in seniority for low values of seniority (the CK e⁄ect), they decrease for higher values
of seniority when higher seniority translates purely into more liquidations. Deviations
from that interior optimum to either side result in less monitoring and possibly more
ine¢ cient liquidations. This result contrasts with the CK benchmark in which higher
seniority for the sophisticated funds is always better.
The precision of the noisy public signal (i.e., the probability that it is correct) is
5one of the key parameters of the model. Its one interpretation is the availability of rel-
evant public information on individual bank performance. This may vary across banks
depending, for example, on asset type. That is, while the market prices of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) or house price changes can shed some light on the fundamen-
tals of a typical mortgage bank that holds mainly arm￿ s length assets (both MBS and
residential mortgage loans), few similarly relevant public signals exist for traditional
banks that hold mainly relationship-based small business loans. The signal precision
can also be interpreted as the correlation between an individual bank￿ s fundamentals
with system-wide outcomes or indicators. With the proliferation of "risk transfer" and
"risk dispersion" mechanisms, individual bank performances have become increasingly
correlated, so that public signals now provide more relevant information on an individual
bank￿ s performance. Note, however, that these costless public signals can only provide
imperfect information on an individual bank￿ s true asset quality.
Our results reveal that the incentives for short-term wholesale ￿nanciers to liquidate
strategically based on a noisy negative signal are higher, and therefore the welfare-
maximizing seniority of wholesale funds (that compensates for excess liquidation incen-
tives) is lower, when:
￿ The noisy public signal is more precise, yet not as precise as to make liquidation
decisions based on it socially optimal;
￿ The share of passive deposits in bank liabilities is higher. Interestingly, the seem-
ingly safe bu⁄er of long-term funds provided by passive retail depositors in fact
makes early liquidations less costly for wholesale ￿nanciers and discourages them
from information acquisition e⁄orts;
￿ Liquidation value of bank assets is higher. Liquidation value relates to a bank￿ s
cash holdings and the marketability of its long-term assets. By conventional wis-
dom, a higher liquidity bu⁄er should better protect a bank against larger with-
drawals. However, in our setup higher liquidation value has detrimental incentive
e⁄ects as well: it lowers the cost of early liquidations for wholesale ￿nanciers and
6increases the probability of ine¢ cient "noisy" liquidations.
￿ Interest rate o⁄ered to wholesale ￿nanciers in case of success is lower. The interest
rate o⁄ered to competitive wholesale ￿nanciers re￿ ects the return on alternative
use of money; it is lower for example in times of abundant liquidity supply. When
the interest rate is lower, wholesale ￿nanciers have less to gain if a project succeeds
in the long term. This encourages early liquidation.
In a bank cross-section, these predictions suggest that the use of senior short-term
funds is bene￿cial in "traditional" banks that hold mainly opaque and nontradeable
relationship loans, consistent with the "bright side" predictions of CK. Yet the "dark
side" negative e⁄ects are likely to dominate in banks with large exposures to arm￿ s length
assets with readily available public information, particularly when short-term wholesale
￿nanciers are senior claimants.3 However, importantly, private incentives would in fact
drive arm￿ s length banks towards actively using senior short-term wholesale funds: we
show that interest rates demanded by wholesale ￿nanciers are lower when assets are
marketable and public signals are available. Therefore, CK￿ s insights best apply to
the traditional relationship banking business with limited public information on asset
quality, while our model sheds light on the new banking business characterized by arm￿ s
length transactions, high interbank correlations, and the availability of relevant public
signals such as market prices and credit ratings.
To sum up, we show that higher seniority for wholesale funds is not always socially
bene￿cial. In the presence of a costless but noisy signal on bank quality, higher seniority
can in fact reduce monitoring and encourage ine¢ cient liquidations. Social welfare is
constrained-maximized for an intermediate level of seniority, depending on the bank￿ s
funding structure (i.e., share of passive retail deposits on the liability side), the precision
of public signals on bank project quality (which often depends on the type of assets held),
liquidation value of bank assets, and interest rates o⁄ered to wholesale ￿nanciers. This
3Note that banks holding securitized assets (e.g. MBS) appear particularly vulnerable to the risk
of premature liquidations: trading of assets provides a public signal on quality, and also raises their
liquidated value.
7is a novel result that usefully contrasts with CK and bears close resemblance to recent
developments in the credit market, as well as some earlier instances of bank failures. It
reveals the "dark" side of short-term wholesale funding, particularly when its providers
are senior claimants.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark CK-
type model of "bright side" of wholesale bank funding. Section 3 introduces the costless
but noisy signal on bank project quality and models the "dark side" of wholesale bank
funding. Section 4 provides a discussion of our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Bright Side of Wholesale Funding
We start by outlining a version of the Calomiris and Kahn (1991) model. We use it to
describe a benchmark "bright side" of bank wholesale funding. (We will use the same
model with minor alterations in later sections to describe a "dark side" of wholesale
funding.)
We demonstrate a number of key e⁄ects. First, the use of wholesale funds allows
banks to expand the volume of lending beyond constraints of the ￿xed local depositor
base. Second, wholesale ￿nanciers have the capacity to monitor banks and, if informed,
exert welfare-enhancing market discipline: roll over funding to good banks but force
liquidation of bad ones. Third, the monitoring incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers are
maximized when they are senior creditors in early liquidations: this allows them to in-
ternalize the bene￿ts of monitoring. Finally, and importantly, pro￿t-maximizing private
choices of banks and wholesale ￿nanciers are consistent with constrained-optimal out-
comes: banks choose a maximum possible amount of wholesale funds and make them
senior, to which wholesale ￿nanciers respond by monitoring and providing market dis-
cipline.
82.1 Model
Consider an economy with three dates: 0;1;2. The economy consists of a bank (with
access to an investment project) and two types of bank ￿nanciers: retail and wholesale.
Everyone is risk-neutral and there is no discounting.
The project A bank has exclusive access to a pro￿table but risky long-term project.
For each unit invested at date 0, the project returns at date 2: X with probability p or
0 with probability 1 ￿ p. The project has a positive net present value: Xp > 1. The
project may also be liquidated at date 1 returning L < 1 per unit initially invested. The
maximum investment size is 1.
Funding The bank has no initial capital and needs to borrow in order to invest. There
are two types of ￿nanciers:
1. "Retail depositors" are unsophisticated and passive. They never get advance infor-
mation on date 2 project realization, and never withdraw before date 2, providing
a bank with a source of stable long-term funds despite being formally demandable.
The passiveness of retail depositors is well-supported in the empirical literature;
also see Shin (2008) for an analysis of the irony that retail deposits turned out
to be the most stable source of funding for Northern Rock during the crisis. The
interest rate payable on retail deposits (date 0 to date 2) is not risk-sensitive and is
￿xed at RD: 1 ￿ RD < pX (risk-sensitive deposit insurance is analyzed in Section
3.5). The key limitation of retail deposits is that they are scarce: the bank is
endowed with a ￿xed deposit base of D < 1.
Using "retail deposits" as a metaphor for long-term funds, this model does not
distinguish nondepository long-term funds such as equity, securitized notes, and
covered bonds in the case of Northern Rock bank. The reason is that nondepository
long-term funds share the same key properties as "retail deposits" in our model.
First and most important, although more sophisticated, by contract they cannot
9withdraw before date 2. Second, nondepository long-term funds are of limited
supply as well. Third, the interest rate on long-term funds is ￿xed before the bank
makes any other funding or investment decisions (e.g., the bank attracts long-term
funds before date 0 when it is not able to commit to any future course of action).
Therefore, long-term debts, wholesale or retail, in this model are analyzed under
the same label of "retail deposits."
2. "Wholesale ￿nanciers" are sophisticated but short-term. They can monitor the
bank at a cost. Monitoring may produce information on date 2 realization before
date 1. Wholesale ￿nanciers can use that information in making roll-over decisions.
Wholesale ￿nanciers are willing to lend to the bank any amount of funds at date
0 against real expected return ￿. Parameter ￿ re￿ ects the return on alternative
use of wholesale ￿nancier￿ s money, and can be interpreted as funding liquidity
conditions. The bank￿ s project is more valuable than alternatives, so that initial
funding is always available: 1 ￿ ￿ < pX.
The amount of wholesale funding attracted by the bank is denoted W. Since
the maximum investment size is 1, W ￿ 1 ￿ D. Wholesale funding needs to be
re￿nanced at date 1. If wholesale ￿nanciers refuse to roll over, the bank is forced
into liquidation. The interest rate on wholesale funding is denoted R. We assume
that R is set from date 0 to date 2. This allows the bank to avoid being hold up by
wholesale ￿nanciers at date 1 (cf. von Thadden, 1995). The payo⁄ to wholesale
￿nanciers in date 1 liquidations is determined by the liquidation value L(D + W)
and their creditor seniority.
For simplicity, in the benchmark model, we consider a single but competitive
wholesale ￿nancier to show that our results can be generated even in the absence
of coordination failures. Section 4.3 discusses issues in the modelling of wholesale
￿nanciers and argues that a more detailed approach would make our key results
only stronger.
10Monitoring A wholesale ￿nancier can obtain information on the bank￿ s date 2 project
realization by monitoring the bank. Monitoring takes place in between dates 0 and 1.
The ￿nancier chooses the intensity of monitoring m : 0 ￿ m < 1. She incurs cost C(m)
(C(0) = 0, C(1) = 1, C0(0) = 0, C00(m) > 0). She then receives a correct signal of
date 2 realization with probability m. That is, when monitoring succeeds, the ￿nancier
obtains precise information of bank project quality. The ￿nanciers receive no signal at
all with probability 1￿m. In that case the ￿nancier knows that monitoring failed, and
remains with information on prior probability of success p only.
Seniority The seniority of wholesale ￿nanciers relative to retail depositors in date 1
liquidations is described by the share s of liquidation value they receive (0 ￿ s ￿ 1).
In early liquidations, wholesale ￿nanciers receive sL(D + W) while retail depositors
(1￿s)L(D +W). Higher s represents a higher creditor seniority of wholesale ￿nanciers
relative to retail depositors. Note that s describes the e⁄ective seniority of wholesale
￿nanciers. In practice, e⁄ective seniority is determined by a range of contractual choices:
formal seniority, collateralization of funding, ￿rst-come-￿rst-served rules, and o¢ cial
resolution options expected to be applied in case of bank failure.
Continuation For determinacy, we assume that at date 1 all agents marginally pre-
fer a bank￿ s continuation to liquidation when otherwise indi⁄erent. Note that, since
L < 1, bankers receive nothing in date 1 liquidations, and will therefore always prefer
continuation. Retail depositors are set up as passive agents who always remain with the
bank until date 2. Therefore, in this model, date 1 liquidations can only be triggered
by short-term wholesale ￿nanciers.
Finally, we focus on the case when the amount of wholesale funding attracted by the
bank is not too small compared to the liquidation value:
pW > L (1)
This single assumption, while mildly restrictive, allows us to keep results easily
11tractable. In particular, it assures that wholesale ￿nanciers are not repaid in full in date
1 liquidations:
WR > L(D + W)
Even more strongly, (1) implies that
pWR > L(D + W)
which rules out outcomes when uninformed senior wholesale ￿nanciers always prefer to
liquidate the bank at date 1 to receive L(D + W) rather than wait until date 2 when
they obtain expected pWR. This captures the stylized fact that "no news is good news"
and absent negative information bank runs should be uncommon.
We analyze the "bright side" model in three steps. First, we consider the basic case
of a bank funded by retail deposits only. Second, we introduce wholesale funds and show
their positive e⁄ect on social welfare in a constrained optimum. Finally, we model the
equilibrium resulting from private choices of banks and wholesale ￿nanciers, and show
that its outcome is consistent with the maximization of social welfare.
2.2 Retail deposits only
Consider ￿rst a bank funded by retail deposits only. Then, its volume of initial invest-
ment D is lower than maximum possible 1. Maintaining spare investment capacity is
ine¢ cient, because the bank￿ s project has a positive net present value.
Furthermore, the bank always continues until date 2. This is because bankers are
at least indi⁄erent when choosing between continuation and liquidation at date 1, while
retail depositors are uninformed and passive. This means that bad projects are not
terminated at date 1 (which would preserve liquidation value L) but continue until date
2 returning 0. This is the second source of ine¢ ciency.
Overall, the net present value of the bank￿ s investment when ￿nanced with retail
12deposits only is:
￿Dep = D(pX ￿ 1) (2)
2.3 Wholesale funds: Welfare maximization
Now consider a bank that also attracts wholesale funds in the amount W. In this
section, we derive the benchmarks for what would be the socially optimal monitoring
and continuation decisions of wholesale ￿nanciers and the amount of wholesale funds
attracted by a bank.
Consider ￿rst the continuation decision. At date 1, if monitoring was successful, a
bad bank (which yields 0 at date 2) needs to be liquidated to preserve L. A good bank
(which yields X at date 2) needs to be re￿nanced. When monitoring was unsuccessful, so
the bank￿ s project quality is unknown, a bank also needs to be re￿nanced since Xp > L.
Consider now the optimal intensity of monitoring, m￿, and the optimal amount of
wholesale funds, W￿. The monetary value of social welfare:
￿ = (D + W)(pX + m(1 ￿ p)L ￿ 1) ￿ C(m) (3)
is maximized for
W￿ = 1 ￿ D
so that a bank uses the maximum possible amount of wholesale funds and the complete
initial investment opportunity of 1 is used, and for m￿ given by
C0(m￿) = (1 ￿ p)L (4)
Comparing (3) with (2) highlights the bene￿cial e⁄ects of the use of wholesale funds:
higher investment volume D + W instead of D, and preserving the liquidation value of
some bad banks m￿(1 ￿ p)L at the cost of monitoring C(m￿).
132.4 Wholesale funds: Private equilibrium
We now derive equilibrium private choices of banks and wholesale ￿nanciers, and com-
pare them with the socially optimal outcome.
Wholesale ￿nanciers Consider ￿rst the choices of wholesale ￿nanciers. They take
decisions on the intensity of monitoring and on continuation (whether to roll over funds
or liquidate the bank). Note immediately that their continuation decision is in line with
the social optimum. If monitoring was successful, wholesale ￿nanciers have incentives
to liquidate bad banks to receive sL(D + W), and to roll over funding to good banks
to receive WR. When monitoring was unsuccessful, uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers
choose to roll over funding since, by (1), pWR > sL(D + W).
Consider now the monitoring decision. In choosing the intensity of monitoring m,
wholesale ￿nanciers maximize:
￿W = pWR + m(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) ￿ C(m)
which obtains their private choice of monitoring intensity mW given by:
C0(mW) = (1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) (5)
Observe from (4) and (5) that mW = m￿ for s = 1 and D+W = 1. This means that
wholesale ￿nanciers choose the optimal intensity of monitoring when they are senior
creditors at the re￿nancing stage and the amount of wholesale funding is the maximum
possible. The intuition for this outcome is that being senior allows wholesale ￿nanciers
to fully internalize the bene￿ts of monitoring: preserved liquidation value L(D + W)
which is higher for a higher use of wholesale funds. Optimal high seniority of whole-
sale ￿nanciers is an important result as it describes the nature of optimal contracting
arrangements between the bank and short-term wholesale ￿nanciers.
14Banks The bank takes decisions on the amount of wholesale funds W to attract and
on the creditor seniority s to o⁄er them. The bank￿ s surplus is:
￿B = p[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ R)] (6)
The interest rate R demanded by competitive wholesale ￿nanciers, obtained from
their zero-pro￿t condition, is:
R =
W￿ + C(mW) ￿ mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W)
Wp
Lemma 1 ￿B increases in s and W.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows. ￿B increases in s because R decreases in s:
as wholesale ￿nanciers receive a larger share in early liquidations, the amount needed
to compensate them in successful outcomes falls. ￿B increases in W because the bank
is able to invest more funds, while at the same time the cost of monitoring per unit of
wholesale funds used falls.
It follows directly from Lemma 1 that a bank acting in its own private interests will
choose the maximum possible W = 1 ￿ D = W￿ and s = 1 = s￿, consistent with the
socially optimal outcome. We can now formulate the main result of this section. It
describes the benchmark "bright side" e⁄ects of bank wholesale funding.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark "bright side" case, the wholesale ￿nanciers￿monitor-
ing and continuation decision, and the banks￿decisions on the amount of wholesale funds
to use and their creditor seniority, are all in line with the constrained social optimum.
In equilibrium, the amount of wholesale funds used by a bank is the maximum possible:
W￿ = 1 ￿ D, wholesale funds are senior: s￿ = 1 so that all bene￿ts of monitoring are
internalized, and the investment of wholesale ￿nanciers in monitoring m￿ is given by
C0(m￿) = L(1 ￿ p).
15Observe that these predictions are fairly strong. Not only is the use of wholesale
funding in banks unambiguously welfare improving, but also the private choices of banks
and wholesale ￿nanciers fully coincide with welfare-maximizing outcomes.
3 The Dark Side of Wholesale Funding
We now turn to the analysis of the "dark side" of bank wholesale funding. Speci￿cally,
in this section we show how a plausible and minor change to the "bright side" CK-style
setup of Section 2 can signi￿cantly alter its results.
To model the "dark side" of wholesale funding, we introduce an additional source
of information available to "sophisticated" wholesale ￿nanciers. We assume that even
when monitoring was unsuccessful (did not produce information about date 2 realiza-
tion, either because of low investment in monitoring or merely by bad luck), wholesale
￿nanciers still obtain a free but noisy signal of date 2 realization in advance of date 1.
That signal is best interpreted as a piece of publicly available information relevant to
the bank￿ s fundamentals but not perfectly so. Long-term debtors do not use this signal
as (for contractual or behavioral reasons) they cannot change course on date 1 once
invested on date 0.
We show that such a seemingly minor twist can lead to di⁄erent outcomes (than
in the CK model) for some banks. The presence of a costless but noisy signal lowers
the incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers to monitor, and gives them excess incentives to
liquidate banks based on overly noisy public information. These distortions are stronger
when wholesale ￿nanciers are made senior claimants to the liquidated assets. The reason
is that they are relatively protected in date 1 liquidations. After liquidation they are
entitled to a larger share of the smaller liquidated value, at the expense of passive
depositors. We show that, as a result, the incentives of opportunistic wholesale ￿nanciers
are most aligned with the social optimum when they are assigned intermediate (rather
than high) creditor seniority at the re￿nancing stage ￿di⁄erent from the CK results.
We further address the incentives of banks. We show that, when banks (because of
16limited liability) do not fully internalize the externalities on the providers of long-term
funds (e.g., retail depositors) resulting from their contracting with short-term wholesale
￿nanciers, they may choose to assign too high seniority to short-term wholesale funds.
This would lead to excess noisy liquidation in equilibrium, and bear close resemblance to
e⁄ects observed during the recent turmoil. Moreover, comparative statics analysis shows
that both the risk of noisy liquidation by wholesale ￿nanciers and the incentives of banks
to borrow funds from them opportunistically ￿the "dark side" of wholesale funding ￿
dominate in "modern" banks characterized by arm￿ s length and tradable assets and an
active combination of retail and wholesale funds in the liability structure.
3.1 Additional feature: A noisy public signal
To model the "dark side" of wholesale funding, we add a free but noisy signal on bank
quality. The free signal is received by wholesale ￿nanciers after monitoring but before
date 1. This sequence re￿ ects the fact that the choice of intensity of monitoring is a
strategic (anterior) decision and that monitoring needs to be performed continuously in
the course of lending. Also observe that while monitoring is assumed to be precise if
successful, the free signal is noisy: widely available public information is of lower quality
than that produced through dedicated private investigation.
We specify the signal to have the same distribution of outcomes as that of the un-
derlying project, but providing only noisy information on the ￿nal outcome. Formally,
the signal takes two values: "positive" or "negative", and is characterized by a precision
parameter ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; ￿ = 0 for uninformative; ￿ = 1 for precise). The probability of
receiving a positive signal is p (same as for X at date 2); conditional on that the proba-
bility of getting X at date 2 is [p + ￿(1 ￿ p)], and that of getting 0 is [(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)].
The probability of a negative signal is 1￿p (same as for 0 at date 2); conditional on that
the probability of getting X at date 2 is [p ￿ ￿p], and that of getting 0 is [(1 ￿ p) + ￿p].
The principal impact of the noisy signal on the mechanics of the model is as fol-
lows. Recall that without such a signal, uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers (who did not
17receive precise information from monitoring) always rolled over funding at date 1. That
was consistent with both welfare maximization (pX > L) and their private incentives
(pWR > sL(D + W)). Now, however, uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers may choose not
to roll over funding after receiving a negative but noisy signal. This paves the way for
early liquidations of banks based only on free but noisy information ("noisy liquida-
tions"). The focus of this section is to show how the possibility of early liquidations
distorts incentives of both wholesale ￿nanciers and banks in such a way that their private
choices may no longer lead to socially optimal outcomes.
We analyze the model in four steps. First, we derive the benchmark for the socially
optimal use of the noisy costless signal. Second, we analyze the incentives of wholesale
￿nanciers. We show that they may have incentives for excess liquidations of banks based
on overly noisy public information, particularly when they are senior. Third, we analyze
socially optimal contracting with wholesale ￿nanciers. We show that, with the risk of
jittery noisy liquidations, it is optimal that wholesale ￿nanciers be assigned intermediate
(rather than high) creditor seniority. Finally, we study incentives of banks, and show
how they can deviate from the socially optimal ones. Bank can opportunistically o⁄er
too high seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers to reduce the interest rates they have to pay
on short-term wholesale funding. This is the reason why ine¢ cient noisy liquidations
can persist in equilibrium.
Throughout the section, we focus on cross-sectional predictions on the risk of early
liquidations and ine¢ cient bank funding choices. In the end of the section, we consider
options for regulatory response.
3.2 Welfare maximization
We start by outlining the benchmark socially optimal decisions on continuation, moni-
toring, and the use of wholesale funds in the presence of a free but noisy signal on bank
project quality.
18Noisy liquidations Consider the optimal use of a noisy public signal. When moni-
toring was successful, bank quality is known precisely. The noisy signal cannot add to
the fundamental information produced through monitoring. As before, good banks need
to be re￿nanced while bad banks need to be liquidated.
When monitoring was unsuccessful, without the noisy signal, continuation was al-
ways optimal at date 1. The noisy signal re￿nes date 1 probabilities of success or failure
at date 2. For a positive noisy signal, the posterior of success at date 2 increases to
p + ￿(1 ￿ p). It remains optimal that the bank is re￿nanced. However, for a negative
noisy signal, the posterior of success at date 2 falls to [p ￿ ￿p]. There are two possible
outcomes. If the precision ￿ of the noisy signal is low so that [p ￿ ￿p]pX ￿ L, it is
still optimal to re￿nance the bank (as was in the case of no information). In this case
the noisy signal is e⁄ectively disregarded: it has no impact on the continuation and by
implication on any other decisions. However, if the precision of the noisy signal ￿ is high
enough so that [p ￿ ￿p]pX < L, it is optimal to liquidate the bank based solely on a
noisy signal. The threshold value of ￿ is




Note that, unless ￿ = 1, some good banks will su⁄er noisy liquidations as well.
Monitoring and use of wholesale funds Now consider how the availability of a
costless noisy signal a⁄ects the optimal intensity of monitoring and the optimal amount
of wholesale funds to use. The impact depends on the precision of a noisy signal. Recall
that, when its precision is low, ￿ ￿ ￿￿, it is optimal to disregard the noisy signal. As a
consequence, the maximization problem is the same as in the benchmark case (3). The
optimal amount of wholesale funds to use is the maximum possible W￿ = 1 ￿ D and
the optimal amount of monitoring is m￿ as de￿ned by (4).
When the precision of the noisy signal is high, ￿ > ￿￿, it is socially optimal to use
the noisy signal, and liquidate the bank when it is negative. The monetary value of
19social welfare in this case is:
￿Liq = (D + W)(m[pX + (1 ￿ p)L] + (1 ￿ m)[p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X + (1 ￿ p)L] ￿ 1)￿C(m)
(8)
The term m[pX + (1 ￿ p)L] is the payo⁄ to successful monitoring, similar to (3).
The term (1 ￿ m)[p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X + (1 ￿ p)L] is novel: it is the payo⁄ from using
the noisy signal when monitoring was unsuccessful (and liquidating the bank upon a
negative signal). The probability of a positive signal is p; conditional on it the bank is
re￿nanced and yields X with probability [p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]. The probability of a negative
signal is (1 ￿ p); the bank is liquidated to preserve L.
As before, the social welfare (8) is increasing W, so that it is optimal to use as much
wholesale funding as possible: W￿
Liq = 1￿D = W￿. The optimal intensity of monitoring
m￿
Liq is given by:
C0(m￿
Liq) = p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)X (9)
Observe that m￿
Liq < m￿. This is easy to verify by applying the condition for using the
noisy signal [p ￿ ￿p]pX < L to (4) and (9). The intuition is that the availability of
a noisy but free signal makes the information obtained through costly monitoring less
valuable.
3.3 Wholesale ￿nanciers: Private incentives and socially optimal se-
niority
Now consider private choices of wholesale ￿nanciers.
Noisy liquidations When monitoring was successful, as before, wholesale ￿nanciers
had incentives to follow its outcome: re￿nance known good banks and force liquidation
of bad ones. When monitoring was unsuccessful, uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers can
use the noisy public signal. Upon a negative noisy signal, their expected continuation
payo⁄ is [p ￿ ￿p]WR. Their liquidation payo⁄ is sL(D + W). For wholesale ￿nanciers,
20it is privately optimal to follow a noisy signal and liquidate the bank for
sL(D + W) > [1 ￿ ￿]pWR (10)
Expression (10) can be interpreted either as su¢ ciently high precision of the noisy signal:




or as su¢ ciently high seniority of wholesale ￿nanciers:




Note that the private threshold ￿W can be either above or below the socially optimal
threshold ￿￿ depending on the value of s. When s is low and ￿W > ￿￿, wholesale
￿nanciers have insu¢ cient private incentives to liquidate banks. When s is high and
￿W < ￿￿, wholesale ￿nanciers have excess private incentives to liquidate banks based
solely on noisy information. However, observe that wholesale ￿nanciers always have
excess incentives to liquidate banks based on noisy information when they are senior (s
is close to 1): ￿W
s=1 < ￿￿.
From this point on, we will focus on the case with the richest interpretations. We
consider the case when private and public incentives to liquidate banks based on noisy
information diverge. Speci￿cally, we consider ￿ in the interval ￿W
s=1 < ￿ < ￿￿. This
describes the environment where the noisy public signal is not very informative, so that
from the social welfare perspective it is optimal to disregard it. However, the signal is
still informative enough to be used by senior wholesale ￿nanciers, and to trigger "noisy"
bank liquidations.
Monitoring Consider now the monitoring choices of wholesale ￿nanciers. Recall that
when wholesale ￿nanciers are su¢ ciently junior, s ￿ sW, they disregard the noisy signal.
Therefore, their private choice of monitoring intensity is the same as the benchmark mW
21(5).
However, when wholesale ￿nanciers are su¢ ciently senior, s > sW, they have incen-
tives to use the noisy public signal and liquidate the bank when it is negative. Then, in
choosing monitoring intensity, they maximize




Liq) = p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)WRLiq (14)
Observe that, unlike in expression for mW (5), s does not enter directly into the
speci￿cation of mW
Liq (14). Rather, it a⁄ects mW
Liq indirectly through RLiq. To see that
in detail, consider the interest rate charged by competitive ￿nanciers:
RLiq =
W￿ + C(mW
Liq) ￿ (1 ￿ p)sL(D + W)
mW
LiqWp + (1 ￿ mW
Liq)[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]Wp
As s increases and wholesale ￿nanciers receive more in date 1 liquidations, they require
less compensation in case of date 2 success: in equilibrium, RLiq decreases in s. There-
fore, since mW
Liq increases in RLiq, it decreases in s. This contrasts with the benchmark
case without the noisy signal where mW (5) increased in s. The intuition behind this
result is that senior wholesale ￿nanciers who can use noisy signals become less inter-
ested in the bank￿ s long-term value. Indeed, they can easily liquidate the bank on mild
negative news before the long-term value is realized, at only very low private cost.
This makes s = sW a threshold point not only for the liquidation decision, but also
for the choice of intensity of monitoring of wholesale ￿nanciers. The properties of sW
are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Consider sW given by (10).
1. For s ￿ sW wholesale ￿nanciers never liquidate a bank based on noisy information
and the intensity of their monitoring increases in seniority: @mW=@s > 0, consistent
22with the benchmark "bright side" of bank wholesale funding.
2. For s > sW uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers choose to liquidate a bank following
a negative noisy signal and the intensity of their monitoring decreases in seniority:
@mW
Liq=@s < 0, contrasting with the "bright side" benchmark.
3. The intensity of monitoring chosen by wholesale ￿nanciers is maximized for
s = sW, that is, for an intermediate value of their seniority.
Proof. See Appendix.
The contrasting e⁄ects of seniority on the behavior of wholesale ￿nanciers with and
without the noisy public signal are illustrated in Figure 1. The left panel shows that,
in the benchmark case without a noisy public signal, the monitoring e⁄ort of wholesale
￿nanciers increases monotonically in their creditor seniority. The right panel depicts
the same relation, but with the noisy signal. There, for low values of seniority, whole-
sale ￿nanciers disregard the noisy signal so their actions are identical to those in the
benchmark case. However, when seniority exceeds the threshold value s = sW, whole-
sale ￿nanciers start (a) to liquidate based on a negative noisy signal, and (b) to reduce
monitoring e⁄orts in response to higher seniority.
23Optimal use and seniority of wholesale funds We now take the incentives of
wholesale ￿nanciers identi￿ed in Lemma 2 as given, and ask what would be the resulting
socially optimal use W and seniority s of wholesale funds. Of course, in practice the
decisions of how much wholesale funds to use and which creditor seniority to o⁄er them
are taken by a bank with the objective of maximizing its private surplus. We will
consider bank￿ s incentives immediately afterwards. However, understanding the socially
optimal use of wholesale funds would allow us to see whether the private choices of banks
are consistent with social welfare maximization, and if not, identify scope for regulatory
intervention.
The key result on the optimal use of wholesale funds by banks is as follows:
Proposition 2 Consider the case with possible welfare-reducing noisy liquidations, ￿W
s=1 <
￿ ￿ ￿￿. Then the socially optimal creditor seniority of wholesale ￿nanciers is s = sW
(12). This is the intermediate level of seniority, lower than the "bright side" benchmark
s = 1. Setting s = sW fully aligns the continuation decision of wholesale ￿nanciers
with the socially optimal: there are no noisy liquidations. At the same time, s = sW
maximizes the intensity of monitoring privately chosen by wholesale ￿nanciers, albeit at
the level below the social optimum: mW(sW) < m￿. The optimal amount of wholesale
funds remains the highest possible W = 1 ￿ D = W￿.
Point sW can be thought of as the highest seniority of short-term wholesale funds
that does not give rise to early liquidations. For s < sW higher seniority increases
the intensity of monitoring chosen by wholesale ￿nanciers. After that, for s > sW,
fundamentally uninformed wholesale ￿nanciers will start liquidating banks based on
a negative noisy signal. That is not socially optimal. Moreover, for s > sW, the
monitoring e⁄ort of wholesale ￿nanciers starts to decrease in higher seniority. In e⁄ect,
for s > sW, higher seniority of wholesale ￿nanciers translates not into increased intensity
of monitoring (as was in the "bright side" case) but purely into excess liquidations ￿
and less monitoring.
The fact that intermediate rather than high seniority of wholesale funds is optimal
24in order to prevent excess liquidations of banks based on overly noisy public information
is a key departure from the CK-type result describing the "bright side" of wholesale
bank funding.
3.4 Comparative statics
Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 o⁄er interesting cross-sectional predictions on (a) the risk
of excessive noisy liquidations in di⁄erent types of banks, and (b) the socially optimal
seniority of short-term wholesale funds in di⁄erent types of banks. Note that (a) and (b)
are just two sides of the same coin: certain bank characteristics that predict a higher risk
of excessive noisy liquidations also prescribe as socially optimal an assignment of lower
seniority to wholesale funds. This would increase the losses that wholesale ￿nanciers
incur in early liquidations, and thus reduce their incentives to liquidate based on overly
noisy information.
Consider inequalities (10) and (12). It is more likely that they are satis￿ed, so that
the risk of noisy liquidations by short-term wholesale ￿nanciers is higher, when:
￿ ￿, the "precision" of the public noisy signal on bank project quality, is higher (but
not perfect). Note that in plain language versus theorist language, ￿ is better
interpreted as the "relevance" of the noisy signal to bank project quality.
￿ The bank￿ s liquidation value L is higher.
Also, from (10), the risk of noisy liquidations is higher when s, the actual seniority
of short-term wholesale funds, is higher. However, this parameter does not vary much
across banks and is less interesting in our comparative statics analysis.
The above two predictions suggest an interesting distinction between (1) "tradi-
tional" banks holding relatively relationship-based small business loans (which are asso-
ciated with low ￿ and L) and (2) "modern" banks holding mostly tradable arm￿ s-length
assets (which are associated with relatively higher liquidation value L, and relatively
25more relevant public information on quality ￿high ￿ ￿because of the availability of
secondary market prices and credit ratings).
In both types of banks, the "bright side" bene￿t as modeled by CK is at work: higher
seniority to wholesale funds encourges them to monitor. However, the "dark side" cost
that works in the opposite direction is likely to be greater for "modern" banks. In
"traditional" banks characterised by low ￿ and L, according to the comparative statics
predictions above, the "dark side" of wholesale funding has a relatively small impact and
is likely dominated by the "bright side" bene￿ts. In this case, the CK model provides a
good approximation of reality. In "modern" banks, however, because of high ￿ and L,
the risk of liquidations based on noisy public information is higher and can o⁄set and
sometimes outweigh the "bright side" bene￿t. In this case, the "dark side" e⁄ect cannot
be neglected.
The results may also have interesting implications for credit cycles. Suppose ￿, the
relevance of a noisy public signal (e.g., the general performance of the banking sector),
is higher during recessions and lower during expansions, i.e., only bad banks fail in
expansions but all banks are a⁄ected in recessions (a la Rajan 1994). Then the liquidity
risk we model should be higher during recessions because macroeconomic news matter
more. However, there is not much consensus on the procyclicality or countercyclicality
of performance di⁄erence between good and bad banks, and therefore our prediction on
the countercyclicality of liquidity risk remains speculative.
Finally, comparative statics can also show that the risk of noisy liquidations by
short-term wholesale funds is higher when:
￿ ￿, the opportunity cost of wholesale funds (which a⁄ects the interest rate R) is
lower. Periods of abundant liquidity are typically characterized by low cost of
wholesale funds ￿.
￿ Wholesale funds W is low relative to retail deposits D. Note that "retail deposit"
should be broadly interpreted as any type of long-term funding. In the case of
Northern Rock, besides 27 percents of customer deposits, D would also include
26contractually long-term securities such as equity, securitized notes, and covered
bonds, which accounted for another 50 percents of the bank￿ s liabilities. Contrary
to media perceptions, in Northern Rock short-term funding W was not very high
relative to long-term funding D. This prediction suggests, interestingly, that long-
term funds D, while being a seemingly safe liability by themselves, also serve as an
exit bu⁄er for short-term wholesale ￿nanciers and make liquidations less costly for
them, increasing the risk of overly noisy liquidations and reducing the wholesale
￿nancier￿ s monitoring incentives.
3.5 Banks￿incentives to use wholesale funds
The previous section has established socially optimal seniority for opportunistic whole-
sale ￿nanciers: how their choices can be brought closer to the social optimum by as-
signing them an intermediate level of creditor seniority sW. However, in practice the
decisions on how much wholesale funds to use and on which creditor seniority to o⁄er
them are taken by a bank with the objective of maximizing its private surplus. In this
section, we will study the incentives of banks, and ask whether unconstrained bank
choices can deviate from the social optimum.
They key mechanism behind the results of this section is that banks do not internalize
the externalities of their contracting with short-term wholesale ￿nanciers on passive
depositors (and other providers of long-term funds). The reason is that the interest rate
on deposits and long-term funds is ￿xed in advance: a higher risk of nonrepayment does
not translate into a correspondingly higher interest rate punishment for a bank. This
leads to a sort of "risk-shifting" behavior on the part of banks: banks with existing
leverage have incentives to attract overly risky secondary sources or funding (cf. Myers
and Majluf, 1984). To sum up, the reason for the externality is that deposits and other
long-term funds are generally not fully e¢ ciently priced.
Bank￿ s choice of seniority for wholesale ￿nanciers Consider the impact of of-
fering wholesale ￿nanciers a higher creditor seniority than is socially optimal: s > sW.
27Recall that the social cost of this action is (a) ine¢ cient noisy liquidations and (b) lower
intensity of monitoring by wholesale ￿nanciers. Let us now consider private costs and
bene￿ts for the bank. The bank￿ s private cost is similar to the social one: a bank loses
when good projects are liquidated prematurely in early liquidation. However the bank
also has a private bene￿t. O⁄ering higher seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers reduces the
interest rate R charged by them. As long as the interest rate charged by providers of
long-term funds (e.g., passive depositors) RD is ￿xed, this leads to an increase in a
bank￿ s surplus. When the net e⁄ect of higher seniority on a bank￿ s surplus is positive
(the lower interest rate e⁄ect dominates the higher risk of liquidation e⁄ect), the bank
has private incentives to o⁄er too high seniority to short-term wholesale ￿nanciers.
To see this formally, compare the bank￿ s surplus from selecting s = sW versus some
s > sW.
For s = sW we have:
￿B
s=sW = p[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ R)] (15)
where
R =
W￿ + C(mW) ￿ mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W)
Wp
s = sW
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[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ RLiq)] (16)
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easy to show formally by substituting expressions for m
W (5), s
W (12), and m
W
Liq (14). The intuition is
that, although at s
W there is a discrete change in the liquidation strategy of wholesale ￿nanciers (from
not using to using the noisy signal), at s
W they are indi⁄erent between the two. Therefore, marginal
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Liq: Observe that ￿B
Liq incorporates a lower probability of a
bank￿ s success: it is reduced by the probability of ine¢ cient liquidations (1￿mW)p(1￿
￿)(1 ￿ p). As a result there is a discrete fall in ￿B as soon as s exceeds sW as a bank
becomes subject to ine¢ cient early liquidations. The value of that fall is
￿ = (1 ￿ mW)p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ R)] (17)
However, after the immediate fall at sW, ￿B
s>sW can start increasing in s. The reason
is that a higher s gives wholesale ￿nanciers more in date 1 liquidations (at no expense
to the bank), and allows the bank to repay them less in case of success at date 2. To
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p(1￿￿)(1￿p)[D(X ￿ RD) + W(X ￿ RLiq)]
(18)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is overall positive: it re￿ ects the reduction in
the interest rate that the bank has to pay on short-term wholesale funds: dRLiq=ds < 0.
The second term on the right-hand side is overall negative: dmLiq=ds < 0 as with
higher s wholesale ￿nanciers lose their incentives to monitor the bank, leading to more
ine⁄ective liquidations.
Either e⁄ect can dominate another depending on parameter values. For example,
one can verify that for a very low L the term dRLiq=ds is so low that the second term
dominates and d￿B
Liq=ds is negative. Then the bank would never have incentives to
choose s > sW. Yet, as another example, when the impact of s on mW
Liq is very small,
the second term is so low that the ￿rst term dominates and d￿B
Liq=ds is positive. In
this case, should the initial fall in a bank￿ s surplus ￿ be outweighed by a subsequent
increase of ￿B
Liq as s becomes high enough, the bank would have incentives to assign
29wholesale ￿nanciers a higher seniority ^ s > sW than is socially optimal.
It is this latter case that corresponds to the dark side of wholesale bank funding.
There, banks opportunistically assign very high seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers in order
to bene￿t from savings on interest rate payments that they have to make in case of
success. Senior wholesale ￿nanciers, in turn, opportunistically liquidate banks based on
very noisy public information, although that is not socially optimal. We now focus on
this case in more detail.
"Dark side" in equilibrium We ￿rst prove the existence of the "dark side" case
when banks have incentives to assign short-term wholesale ￿nanciers a higher creditor
seniority than is socially optimal.
Proposition 3 There exist parameter values of ￿, L, D, W and ￿ such that for some
^ s > sW: ￿B
Liq(^ s) > ￿B
s=sW so that a bank has incentives to assign higher creditor
seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers than is socially optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 is the key result of this paper. It proves the existence of the "dark
side" of wholesale funding. It demonstrates the existence of outcomes where banks
opportunistically assign too high seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers, while wholesale ￿-
nanciers opportunistically liquidate banks based on too noisy public information can
exist in equilibrium.
We now turn to comparative statics. In order to formulate tractable results, we
require an additional simpli￿cation. We focus on the case when mLiq is relatively un-
a⁄ected by changes in exogenous parameters that we are going to vary. This is the
case, for example, when C(m) is relatively ￿ at. Otherwise minor changes in exogenous
parameters could lead to signi￿cant changes in mLiq (e.g., it may suddenly turn into
zero) which would signi￿cantly complicate the analysis.
Under this condition, interest rate saving e⁄ects likely dominate higher probability
of bank failure e⁄ects in d￿B
Liq=ds, and therefore on the net increase bank￿ s incentives
30to choose s > sW over sW when:
￿ The precision of a noisy signal on bank project quality ￿ is higher (but not perfect).
The intuition is that a higher ￿ makes the liquidation decisions more precise (but
again not perfect) and therefore less costly: it is easy to see in (17) that a higher
￿ reduces ￿. One can also observe in (18) that a higher ￿ increases a multiplier
of dRLiq=ds, leading to a higher d￿B
Liq=ds.
￿ The bank￿ s liquidation value L is higher. To verify this observe ￿rst that L does
not a⁄ect ￿. The reason is that although L enters expressions for R and mW it
does so always proportionally to sW. Yet sW itself is inversely proportional to L
(as seen in (12)). Therefore d￿=dL = 0. At the same time a higher L increases
the value of dRLiq=ds leading to a higher d￿B
Liq=ds.
Observe that these predictions are reinforcing the comparative statics observed in
the incentives of providers of wholesale funds. Precisely the same characteristics of
"modern" rather than "traditional" banking ￿more relevant public signals on project
quality and a higher liquidation value ￿ increase the risk of "noisy" liquidations by
wholesale ￿nanciers and make banks more likely to assign the providers of wholesale
funds with ine¢ ciently high creditor seniority.
We will not formulate results for the impact of funding structure (D and W) on
banks￿incentives. The reason is that those are ambiguous. Higher D and W increase
both losses due to noisy liquidations ￿ and interest rate savings dRLiq=ds. Depending
on parameter values, either e⁄ect can dominate.
To close the solution, we verify that the bank always chooses to use the maximum
amount of wholesale funds W = 1 ￿ D = W￿. Lemma 1 proved that ￿B increases in
W for s ￿ sW. It is straightforward to obtain through similar derivations that ￿B
Liq
also increases in W (there is an additional e⁄ect that as mW
Liq falls in W the probability
of noisy liquidations falls, increasing ￿B
Liq). The intuition, as before, is that using a
higher amount of wholesale funds allows banks to utilize more of the valuable investment
opportunity and to reduce the per-unit cost of monitoring.
313.6 Policy response
Our model has identi￿ed potential ine¢ ciencies in the banks￿use of wholesale funds:
￿ Wholesale ￿nanciers can liquidate banks based on overly noisy public signals;
￿ Banks can assign too high seniority to wholesale ￿nanciers, creating greater risk
of early liquidations.
Here we analyze actions that regulators can take to bring the choices of banks and
wholesale ￿nanciers closer to the social optimum. While regulators have little leverage
over the actions of wholesale ￿nanciers, they can try and in￿ uence banks￿choices. Their
objective is to make sure that the banks do not assign wholesale ￿nanciers seniority
higher than s = sW as de￿ned by (12): Below we describe some tools at their disposal.
Imposing lower seniority for short-term wholesale ￿nanciers If regulators
could directly dictate e⁄ective seniority for short-term wholesale ￿nanciers, they could
simply impose s = sW. Yet there are a number of reasons why this may be di¢ cult
or impossible. First, optimal seniority sW varies across banks and over time as bank
characteristics change. Second, as s is de￿ned as e⁄ective seniority and not just formal
seniority, statutory requirements can be irrelevant. Finally, a high s is implied by the
￿rst-come-￿rst-served withdrawal rule: historically most wholesale funds managed to
exit before retail depositors started to form lines.
Taxing the use of short-term wholesale funds Recall that the private incentives
of banks are not in line with the socially optimal because banks do not internalize the
negative e⁄ects (on depositors and other providers of long-term funds) of the use of
risky senior short-term wholesale funding. The interest rate RD is risk-insensitive due
to the protection by deposit insurance, or in any case is set before short-term funds
are attracted. Moreover a bank is typically unable to commit in advance to any future
course of actions relating to its future funding choices. As our model shows, by o⁄ering
32a higher s to wholesale ￿nanciers, the bank is able to save on its total interest rate
payments by paying a lower interest rate to wholesale ￿nanciers.
Authorities can attempt to restore a bank￿ s incentives to social optimal by charging
the bank (through taxes or deposit insurance premia) for whatever private bene￿ts it
obtains through o⁄ering a too high s to wholesale ￿nanciers. The problem, again, is
how to de￿ne "too high" an s. Recall that the threshold value sW for "too high" is
di⁄erent for di⁄erent banks. We ￿rst analyze a possible taxation structure that does
not rely on knowing the precise sW for each bank, identify its shortcomings, and then
propose a taxation structure that requires knowing sW (which is thus more di¢ cult to
implement).
Consider ￿B
Liq: the bank￿ s pro￿t function at s > sW (16). Again assume for simplicity
that the e⁄ects of wholesale ￿nanciers￿monitoring choices are secondary: m is ￿xed.
Interest rate savings from a given s are (1 ￿ p)sL(D + W): To remove them from the
pro￿t function the bank can be taxed or charged with a deposit insurance premium of
T = (1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) (19)





=ds < 0. The intuition is that the interest rate
savings e⁄ect is now o⁄set by tax T on the opposite direction. Under such a tax, a bank
has no incentive to choose s > sW.
However, under tax T that does not rely on knowing sW the bank has no incentive
to choose sW either. Consider ￿B: the bank￿ s pro￿t for s < sW (6). There, interest rate





0. Under a tax T (19) a bank simply has no incentives to choose any s > 0 because
the tax penalizes the use of senior wholesale funds in general, even when the seniority
assigned to wholesale funds is lower than sW.5
5Interestingly, the tax T although blunt can be welfare improving under some conditions. To see
that, consider the case when the level of monitoring is almost ￿xed. Then the key to achieving high
social welfare is to avoid ine⁄ective liquidations. The tax T does just that. More generally, observe that
the tax T reduces monitoring incentives compared to the socially optimal level but improves liquida-
tion incentives. When it is more important to avoid ine¢ cient liquidations rather than to incentivize
monitoring, tax T improves social welfare.
33To address this problem, authorities could try to relate taxes or insurance premia to
sW. Certainly, their ability to implement such taxes depends on knowing sW for each
individual bank. The revised insurance premia formula
^ T = (1 ￿ p)maxf(s ￿ sW);0gL(D + W)
would counterbalance banks￿incentives to choose s > sW but would not a⁄ect banks￿
choices on s ￿ sW, therefore leading to a socially optimal outcome s = sW. This formula
imposes higher information requirements on the authorities. Besides higher premia for
more risky banks (higher 1 ￿ p), it prescribes a number of other bank characteristics
that the authorities should target.
First, the formula suggests that banks assigning higher e⁄ective seniority s to whole-
sale funds should pay a higher deposit insurance premium. In practice, it is hard to
quantify s. However, it is fair to say that under a ￿rst-come-￿rst-served withdrawal
rule wholesale funds with shorter remaining maturity enjoy relatively higher e⁄ective
seniority than those with longer remaining maturity.
Second, it is important to identify a bank￿ s optimal seniority sW, which varies across
banks dependent on a number of parameters re￿ ecting bank characteristics. We can com-
pute the optimal seniority sW in our theoretic model because the model is very stylized.
In practice, the authorities can also rely on a small number of key bank characteristics
to approximate sW. For example, our model predicts that banks holding arm￿ s length
assets are associated with a lower sW than banks holding mainly relationship-based
small business loans, because the former are typically associated with higher L and ￿.
Therefore, a bank with a high percentage of small business loans may be exempted from
such an insurance premium surcharge imposed on high arm￿ s length asset banks.
Third, this optimal deposit insurance premium formula suggests that the premium
be assessed in proportion to the bank￿ s total liabilities D +W rather than only insured
retail D. The reason is that the externalities imposed by the use of short-term wholesale
funds ￿which risk-based deposit insurance attempts to correct ￿are proportional to the
34total value of liabilities.6
Finally, the formula also suggests charging higher premia for banks with more liquid
balance sheets (i.e., higher L). This might sound counter-intuitive at ￿rst sight, because,
in models that feature coordination failures (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), a more
liquid balance sheet may reduce the probability of bank runs. However, the reality is
that wholesale funds usually manage to run down a bank￿ s liquid assets ahead of retail
depositors, and therefore the bene￿ts of a liquid balance sheet accrue mainly to the short-
term wholesale ￿nanciers and not to the retail depositors or the deposit insurance agency.
Indeed, as re￿ ected in our model, short-term ￿nanciers charge lower interest rates for
funding banks with a more liquid balance sheet, and banks use such funds because of
the lower interest costs. We are not the ￿rst to uncover a "paradox of liquidity." Myers
and Rajan (1998) show that greater asset liquidity reduces the management￿ s ability to
commit credibly to an investment strategy that protects investors. In our case, greater
asset liquidity, by allowing the wholesale ￿nanciers to exit without much loss, reduces
their incentive to adopt liquidation strategies that protect retail depositors.
Outright ban on the use of short-term wholesale funds Another option is to
restrict the use of wholesale funds in certain banks.
Lemma 3 There exist parameter values of ￿, L, D, W and ￿ such that social welfare
under W = 0 is higher than W = 1 ￿ D when banks are opportunistic.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that there exist parameter values such that an outright ban on the
banks￿use of wholesale funds is better than exposing the system to the risk of noisy
6Interestingly, this corresponds to the current FDIC policy that assesses deposit insurance premia
based on a bank￿ s "total deposits" (i.e., not only insured deposits but also uninsured ones that behave like
wholesale funds, such as jumbo CDs). The stated reason for this FDIC policy is that it is technically
di¢ cult to separate insured and uninsured deposit accounts. Our model o⁄ers a deeper economic
explanation: such a policy reduces banks￿incentive to attract risky short-term wholesale funds such
as jumbo CDs. Our model further suggest that the FDIC can do even better by including in the
assessment base all other short-term liabilities, such as commercial paper and interbank borrowings, as
well as possibly long-term liabilities.
35liquidations. The intuition is that the cost of not using wholesale funds is unused invest-
ment opportunities and no monitoring. Yet when unused investment opportunities are
not too high and when wholesale ￿nanciers provide little monitoring (which is plausible
when they are too senior and hence by Lemma 2 have lower incentives to monitor), an
outright ban on the use of wholesale funding is banks can improve social welfare.
Note that unused investment opportunities are not too high when D is high. As
we showed in comparative statics in Section 3.3, these are precisely the values where
wholesale ￿nanciers￿are likely not to monitor banks. So for such depository banks it
will most likely be socially optimal to restrict their use of wholesale funds. On the
use of wholesale funds, Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2008) also provide a model to
explain why markets for rollover debt may experience sudden freezes and also suggest a
regulatory restriction against excessive reliance on rollover ￿nance. However, our model
prescribes such a restriction only for some banks meeting the conditions described above,
and that the ban may not be optimal for others.
4 Discussion
4.1 Relationship to corporate ￿nance literature
The tension between the lenders￿incentives to monitor and the risk of ine¢ cient early
liquidations, associated with the use of short-term debt, has been well explored in the
corporate ￿nance literature. Sharpe (1991), Diamond (1992), and Titman (1992) con-
sider settings in which short-term lenders can refuse to roll over funding in the case of
bad news at the intermediate stage of a project￿ s realization, creating the risk of ine¢ -
cient liquidations. The incentives to liquidate prematurely can increase further when the
lender enjoys an informational monopoly at the re￿nancing stage (Rajan, 1992). Berglof
and von Thadden (1994) show how incentives of short-term ￿nanciers to monitor and
liquidate can be balanced by o⁄ering short-term lenders an optimal senior claim that
36gives them a higher liquidation payo⁄ at the expense of long-term creditors.7
While in the corporate ￿nance literature, banks are typically considered as lenders
to industrial ￿rms, our paper looks at banks as borrowers from potentially sophisticated
￿nanciers. Indeed, banks are intermediaries and need to borrow in order to invest.
While our ￿ndings can be applied to the funding choices of industrial ￿rms in general,
the model generates stronger and speci￿c e⁄ects for banks because banks as borrowers
di⁄er from industrial ￿rms in several critical ways.
First, while most industrial projects are illiquid and lack secondary markets in claims,
the assets of modern banks in the originate-and-distribute business are often traded
in secondary markets with available pricing information and credit ratings. The key
contribution of our model is the cross-sectional prediction that di⁄erentiates sW (socially
optimal seniority for short-term wholesale funds) across types of banks depending on
their asset- and liability-side characteristics. The model suggests that the dark side
of short-term wholesale funding dominates when assets are liquid and relevant public
signals on their quality are available. Since liquid secondary markets are more common
for bank assets than for industrial projects, our model is naturally more relevant for
banks than for industrial ￿rms. For industrial ￿rms, the positive e⁄ect of short-term
debt seniority on incentives to monitor (Park, 2000) may dominate the negative e⁄ect
of ine¢ cient early liquidations. For banks, and in particular for those holding arm￿ s
length assets with liquid secondary markets, the opposite can be true, as highlighted by
the model.
Second, unlike industrial corporations, banks might have little control over the ef-
fective seniority of short-term wholesale funds. The ￿rst-come-￿rst-served sequential
service rule in practice and by default gives e⁄ective seniority to short-term wholesale
funds. Formal seniority is not as important as debt maturity in determining e⁄ective
7Von Thadden (1995) shows that the problem of ine¢ cient intermediate liquidations might be best
solved by issuing long-term debt in the form of a credit line with a termination clause (so that second-
period interest rates is pre-speci￿ed ex-ante; the lender cannot bargain based on its information monopoly
but could still liquidate a bad project). Similarly, Rajan and Winton (1995) show that covenants
(termination clauses) on long-term debt (if they are based on privately available information) may be a
better way to induce information acquisition by banks than simple short-term debt.
37seniority. Formal seniority steps in only after a bank is legally declared insolvent and
redemptions of all debt are suspended. Yet in practice it is very di¢ cult to call a bank￿ s
insolvency: unlike industrial ￿rms, the solvency line can be crossed within days if not
hours. This allows short-term ￿nanciers to withdraw and exit ahead of other creditors,
including those with formal seniority, while the bank is insolvent but still liquid.
Finally, the funding structure of banks is relatively less ￿ exible than that of non-
￿nancial corporations. Indeed, the optimal contracting literature (e.g., Berglof and
von Thadden, 1994) typically presents its results as an optimal funding strategy for a
corporation, determining the mix and relative seniority of short- and long-term funding.
In contrast, the funding structure of banks is usually quasi-￿xed. For example, banks
are endowed with a local retail depositor base as the main if not the sole source of long-
term funding, which is prohibitively costly to expand. Therefore, there is less scope to
choose the optimal structure of short- versus long-term funding.
In fact, for banks, such constraints on contracting with the providers of funds may
mean that a socially optimal seniority of short-term wholesale funds sW may altogether
be impossible to implement when some practical restrictions (i.e., a ￿rst-come-￿rst-
served constraint) bound possible s from below. When sW cannot be implemented, the
banks￿use of short-term wholesale funds will always be socially ine¢ cient and associ-
ated with the lack of monitoring and excess liquidations. However, the cross-sectional
implications of our model will still hold and predict that banks with more arm￿ s length
assets will be more a⁄ected by the impossibility to implement sW than traditional banks
with relationship loans.
4.2 Arm￿ s length banking, wholesale funding, and ￿nancial fragility
The results of our model help explain two stylized facts highlighted by the behaviors of
banks in recent years leading up to the recent ￿nancial turmoil:
￿ Why, in practice, do we observe that traditional banks funding mainly relationship
loans are less likely to supplement retail deposits with short-term wholesale funds,
38while banks holding relatively arm￿ s length assets are more likely to do so? (Berlin
and Mester, 1999; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Song and
Thakor, 2007) Why is the proliferation of securitizations (and thus more arm￿ s
length assets on banks balance sheets) closely related to more active use of short-
term wholesale funds?
￿ In the years leading up to the current credit market turmoil, why didn￿ t the whole-
sale ￿nanciers, who had the capacity to monitor, exert su¢ cient market discipline
on banks, and why did they exacerbate liquidity risks once the crisis was on the
way?
The analyses of our model provide some new explanations. In our model, the whole-
sale ￿nancier￿ s incentives to incur private monitoring e⁄orts depend on (1) the avail-
ability and relevance of the costless public signal and (2) the private costs of liquidating
the bank (note also that short-term wholesale funds in practice enjoy more senior cred-
itor access to the liquidated assets). Arm￿ s length assets and relationship loans di⁄er
critically in both of these two parameters:
￿ Arm￿ s length assets typically have some costless public signals available in the form
of secondary market prices or credit ratings, and they also have lower liquidation
costs. According to our model, wholesale ￿nanciers will demand lower interest
rates for funding banks holding arm￿ s length assets because of the lower need
to incur private monitoring costs and the lower losses associated with premature
liquidations.
￿ Relationship-based loans in contrast have few relevant public signals available and
such assets typically have higher liquidation costs. Banks ￿nancing relationship
loans thus need to pay a higher interest rate to attract short-term wholesale funds
to compensate for their private monitoring costs.
￿ Therefore, banks holding relationship loans typically ￿nd it more expensive to
use wholesale funding, which answers our ￿rst question: why banks holding rela-
39tively arm￿ s length transaction loans or securities are more likely to use short-term
wholesale funds.
In the years leading up to the 2007 credit market crisis, ￿nancial innovations and
global liquidity conditions induced banks to acquire more arm￿ s length assets, which
have more abundant supply (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2008). Banks in
turn ￿nanced these assets heavily with short-term wholesale funds, because such an
asset-liability match reduces funding costs (which is consistent with the predictions of
our model). However, our model also shows that such a bank asset-liability match
pattern observed in practice, although consistent with the banker￿ s private incentive, is
not necessarily consistent with the maximization of social welfare.
Our model explains how the availability of costless but noisy public signals on bank
quality reduces the incentives of wholesale ￿nanciers to monitor and creates incentives for
them to exit based on a negative noisy signal. Our model further shows how this e⁄ect
is strengthened by their e⁄ective seniority over other longer-term sources of funding,
such as retail deposits. The analysis of our model is consistent with the behaviors of
short-term wholesale funds in many bank failure events, such as Continental Illinois,
Northern Rock, IndyMac, and reveal the "dark side" of bank wholesale funding:
￿ The short-term wholesale funds seemed to have acted based on noisy public signals
(sometimes correct, sometimes not) more than private information on individual
banks￿ fundamentals. In the case of Continental Illinois￿ s failure, the collapse
of the energy sector and the Penn Square Bank (to which the market suspected
Continental Illinois had large exposures) triggered the event. In the case of the
Northern Rock failure, the US subprime mortgage crisis caused the freezing of
wholesale funding markets across the board, although Northern Rock had no ma-
terial exposure to the US subprime sector8;
8In a letter to The Economist, the chairman of Northern Rock, Matt Ridley, wrote: "We were
repeatedly advised that liquidity in wholesale markets depended on lending quality: good loan books
would continue to attract funding when bad loans began to default. Instead, from August 9, liquidity
had dried up across all wholesale markets, making no distinction between loans of di⁄erent quality, for
much longer than even the most extreme forecast."
40￿ When the short-term wholesale funds exit, they typically managed to withdraw
ahead of the retail depositors and the authorities, and su⁄ered few losses.9
To maximize social welfare, our model suggests that, in order to dampen their in-
centives to prematurely liquidate banks based on noisy public signals, banks relying
on wholesale funding should either make their loans more relationship-based or re-
duce the e⁄ective seniority of the wholesale funds.10 Such changes in asset-liability
arrangement can encourage market discipline and reduce liquidity risks (the bene￿ts
of which are not fully internalized by the banks), but will also raise the interest rate
demanded by the wholesale ￿nanciers, reducing the pro￿ts of the banks. Therefore,
the self-interest of bankers would not lead them to adopt the socially optimal solution
described above, and would instead drive them to adopt the more fragile asset-liability
structures that we observe in practice, i.e., banks funding relatively arm￿ s length assets
such as mortgage-backed securities are more enthusiastic in complementing their retail
deposits with short-term wholesale funds. As discussed in previous section, taxation
or deposit insurance premiums that are fairly assessed on banks may help restore the
socially optimal incentives.
Note that the model applies also to ￿nancial institutions that operate without retail
depositors and use wholesale funds only. Con￿ icts of interest that we describe exist
whenever liquidation payo⁄s are (for contractual or behavioral reasons) skewed across
di⁄erent classes of creditor claimants, e.g., short-term vs. long-term wholesale funds, or
collateralized vs. unsecured wholesale funds. For example, Bear Stearns was ￿nanced
9Interestingly, the well-publicized retail depositor run on Northern Rock took place only after the
bank had already nearly exhausted its liquid assets to pay o⁄ the exit of short-term wholesale funds.
Marino and Bennett (1999) analyze six major bank failures in the US between 1984 and 1992 and
￿nd that uninsured large deposits fell signi￿cantly relative to small insured deposits prior to failures.
During the New England banking crisis, failing banks experienced a 70 percent decline in their uninsured
deposits in their ￿nal two years of operation while being able to raise insured deposits to replace the
out￿ ow. Billett, Gar￿nkel, and O￿ Neal (1998) also ￿nd that bank typically raised their use of insured
deposits vis-a-vis wholesale deposits after being downgraded by Moody￿ s.
10Recall that the e⁄ective seniority of wholesale funds re￿ ects a combination many factors: o¢ cial
resolution policies (such as deposit insurance coverage in bank failures, and the treatment of wholesale
creditors in central bank bailouts), private contractual arrangements (such as the collateralization of
funding and inclusion of withdrawal suspension clauses), and behavioral factors (such as the sluggishness
of the retail depositors). Observe that, by default, short-term wholesale ￿nanciers do enjoy e⁄ective
seniority because of the ￿rst-come-￿rst-served rule; any deviations from that would require additional
contractual arrangements.
41by both long-term and short-term wholesale funds, with most of the short-term funds
collateralized by marketable assets. Our model explains why secured short-term lenders,
being e⁄ectively more senior, had insu¢ cient incentives to acquire information on the
bank￿ s fundamentals, and were tempted to walk out upon noisy negative news. Had
short-term wholesale funds been unsecured or with longer contractual maturity (imply-
ing lower e⁄ective seniority), their providers would have had higher incentives to monitor
and would have been less likely to abruptly stop funding Bear Stearns.
4.3 Modelling wholesale ￿nanciers
Our paper used a number of convenient simpli￿cations in modelling wholesale ￿nanciers.
Most notably we considered a single competitive wholesale ￿nancier. It is possible to
write a similar model with multiple ￿nanciers. The most natural consequence of having
multiple ￿nanciers would be the scope for coordination failure between them at the
re￿nancing stage (for example, of the type analyzed by Rochet and Vives, 2004). Yet
it is important to point out that any coordination failures would only increase the
possibility of ine¢ cient liquidations by wholesale ￿nanciers. Coordination failures are
an additional, yet already well analyzed, facet of the "dark side" of bank wholesale
funding. By analyzing a single competitive ￿nancier, we turn o⁄coordination failures in
our model, and highlight our new and stronger results that ine¢ cient liquidations can
occur even in the absence of coordination failures.
For modelling brevity, we have also explicitly ruled out any hold-up at date 1 by
pre-determining the date 1 to date 2 interest rate in a manner similar to von Thadden
(1995). Competition and interest-rate setting by wholesale ￿nanciers can be modelled
more fully in the style of Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004). Such enhancements
would not a⁄ect our key results.
Finally, there are other dimensions of wholesale bank funding markets that were left
outside of the scope of this paper. For example, interbank lending often represents a
substantial share of wholesale funding of banks. Considering bank inter-linkages within
42the "dark side" framework could generate a richer picture of systemic e⁄ects, with
implications, for example, for peer-monitoring (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) and contagion
(Allen and Gale, 2000, Freixas et al., 2000, Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). We leave
such applications of our framework for future analysis.
5 Conclusion
Our paper demonstrates the possibility of opportunistic behaviors by short-term whole-
sale ￿nanciers (where they do not monitor banks and instead withdraw based on noisy
public signals) and by banks (where they use such risky wholesale funds).
We show how short-term wholesale ￿nanciers can create a "run" on banks based on
costless but possibly very noisy public signals about bank asset quality. Their incentives
to run may o⁄set or even dominate the incentives to monitor which were highlighted by
Calomiris and Kahn (1991). In principle, the risk of wholesale runs can be reduced by
assigning them lower creditor seniority. However banks may have contrasting private
incentives: we show that the use of senior wholesale funds generates interest rate savings
for banks. Moreover, making short-term wholesale funds su¢ ciently junior may be
outright impossible due to the sequential service constraint.
In a bank cross-section, our model predicts that the use of short-term wholesale
funds would have more bene￿cial e⁄ects for "traditional" banks holding mainly opaque
and non-tradeable relationship loans. In contrast, it is likely that this would create
additional risks for "modern" banks holding mostly arm￿ s length assets with readily
available, but noisy, public signals on their fundamentals. Examples of such signals
include mortgage-backed securities prices, performance of other similar banks, and the
health of the housing market. These predictions are consistent with evidence from the
credit markets turmoil of 2007￿ .
The paper discusses a number of policy options, including a risk-based deposit insur-
ance (or taxation) formula that takes into account the di⁄erential in￿ uence of short-term
wholesale funds on di⁄erent types of banks.
43A Proofs
Lemma 1
1. To see that d￿B=ds > 0 consider:
d￿B
ds
= mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) ￿
d(C(mW) ￿ mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W))
ds
Use (5) to re-arrange:
d￿B
ds





= mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W) + mWC00(mW)
dmW
ds
Observe that mW(1￿p)sL(D+W) > 0. Recall that C00(mW) > 0 and dmW=ds >
0: Therefore both terms are positive and d￿B=ds > 0. QED.






= pX ￿ ￿ ￿
d(C(mW) ￿ mW(1 ￿ p)sL(D + W))
dW
Use (5) to re-arrange:
d￿B
dW





= pX ￿ ￿ + mWC00(mW)
dmW
dW
Recall that pX > ￿. Also recall that C00(mW) > 0 and dmW=dW > 0. Therefore
d￿B=ds > 0. QED.
Lemma 2 Points 1 and 2 were explained in text. Point 3 requires that mW and mW
Liq
are continuous at sW: This is easy to verify by applying [p ￿ ￿p]pWR = sWL(D + W)
from (12) to mW (5) and mW
Liq(14). QED.
44Proposition 3 We construct an example of parameters under which a bank chooses
to assign short-term wholesale ￿nanciers creditor seniority s = 1 instead of s = sW.
This is su¢ cient to prove existence.
1. Consider a function C(m) which is almost horizontal until the close environ of
certain ￿ m, is increasing in that small environ, and is almost vertical after that.
This makes the wholesale ￿nanciers￿choice of monitoring always very close to ￿ m.
Such a function allows us to make the e⁄ects on seniority on m secondary to the
e⁄ects of seniority on liquidation decisions and interest rates.
2. We further take:
￿ ￿ m and C(￿ m) to be both close to 0
￿ liquidation value L to be the highest possible: L = pW
￿ precision of signal ￿ to be the highest possible: ￿ = ￿￿ = 1 ￿ L
pX = 1 ￿ W
X
3. Under these conditions:
R(sW) =













4. We can substitute everything into the inequality in question:
(1 ￿ p)L(D + W)(1 ￿ sW) > ￿



















5. Arranging terms gives:
X(D + W) > D(X ￿ 1) + WX
D > 0
which always holds. QED.
456. 6. As a side-line, note that the inequality (1￿p)L(D+W)(1￿sW) > ￿ does not
necessarily hold under milder condition. For example, it does not hold for L close
to 0, for ￿ close to to ￿W (which would make sW = 1).
Lemma 3
1. Consider similar parameter values as those in the proof of Proposition 2. Then an
unregulated bank chooses W = 1 ￿ D and s = 1. Then the social welfare is
￿Liq = [p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X + (1 ￿ p)L] ￿ 1
2. The social welfare under W equal to 0 is
￿+ = D(pX ￿ 1)
3. Now take D is close to 1, so that W (and hence L) are both close to 0 in the
non-zero case. Then ￿+ > ￿Liq reduces to
pX > p[p + ￿(1 ￿ p)]X
QED
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